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»American Empire« as Will and Idea
The new Grand Strategy of the Bush Administration
America has no empire to extend
or utopia to establish
G. W. Bush, 2002
We don’t seek empires,
we’re not imperialistic. We never have been
D. Rumsfeld, 28 April 2003
Now really, the United States
is certainly not an empire
J. Fischer, 2003
What is needed is a new kind of imperialism
R. Cooper, advisor to Tony Blair, 2002 
A new Grand Strategy for a New World Order is in
the making. Its central idea is to protect global capi-
talism through American Empire. It encompasses
unrivalled military superiority, the ability to wage
preventive wars and a new justification of the global
sovereignty of the USA.
Updated and fully revised, May 2003
The new division of the world
The terror attack on the World Trade Center on 11 Sep-
tember 2001 was a »transformational moment« (Jessica
T. Mathews) that focused and expedited the conceptual
thinking and politics of the political class in the USA –
after all it found itself under direct physical threat for
the first time. The process came to a tentative conclu-
sion with the paper »National Security Strategy of the
United States of America« (NSS), which was published
on 17 September 2002. The text in the style of a politi-
cal manifesto articulates the current US administration’s
understanding of power politics and the ensuing con-
ception of a New World Order. It was put to a first
test in the latest war on Iraq. The »transformational
moment« was transformed into an »imperial moment«.
According to the preface to the NSS, signed by George
W. Bush, the long struggle of the last century between
freedom and totalitarianism ended with a »decisive vic-
tory for the forces of freedom«. What prevailed is »a
single sustainable model for national success: freedom,
democracy, and free enterprise« and an unequivocal role
of the USA in this blueprint of the world. »Today, the
United States enjoys a position of unparalleled military
strength and great economic and political influence.«1
This assessment of a qualitatively new disparity of
power can also be heard outside the USA – as early as the
beginning of 1999 the then French foreign minister
Hubert Védrine spoke of the »hyperpower« USA2 – and,
of  course, above all within the USA itself. For the liberal
historian Paul Kennedy, author of The Rise and Fall of
the Great Powers, »Nothing has ever existed like this
disparity of power; nothing.«3, and at the beginning of
2003 James Kurth summed it up in the influential neo-
conservative journal The National Interest: »The first
decade of the 21st century, like the first decade of the
20th, is an age of empire. A hundred years ago, however,
there were many empires (...) Today, there is only one
empire – the global empire of the United States.« 4  Tony
Judt described this disparity of power in the New York
Review of Books as a new global inequality: »Our world is
divided in many ways: rich/poor; North/South; Western/
non-Western. But more and more, the division that counts
is the one separating America from everyone else.«5 And
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2for some, even Europe suddenly finds itself in a different
situation: »Welcome to the rest of the world.«6
In order to consolidate this lead on all other powers in
the world, a new strategy, global in scope, was devel-
oped starting in 1989. During the second Bush adminis-
tration, it became gradually more audible in the dome-
stic aftermath of the »War on Terror« and was reflected
in the National Security Directive of 17 September
2002. The National Security advisor responsible for it,
Condoleeza Rice, compared this development in April
2002 with the inception of the containment strategy
directed against the Soviet Union after World War II.
The players
This process was directly supported by a group of neo-
conservative intellectuals from think tanks and strategic
planning institutions as well as policy-makers from the
military. At the beginning of the 1970’s they agreed in
their criticism of détente and in the 1980’s under Rea-
gan they began to climb the ladder of power. In the first
Bush administration they attained a minority position in
the military executive, then finally achieved a hegemo-
nic majority status in the second Bush administration.
Subsequently they also asserted this position in the
Republican Party in an alliance with the Christian Right,
which is firmly anchored in the South of the USA, with
the radical market ideologists and the classical, more or
less socially conservative Republican mainstream Right
(»compassionate conservatism«).
In the course of 2002 they dominated the foreign policy
debate in the USA. They outlined the key military
policy aspects of the new Grand Strategy, incorporated
them into an optimistic view of the state of the US econ-
omy and in 2002 established themselves as the van-
guard of the new non-partisan movement calling for
war. In record time they got nearly the whole foreign
policy elite of the USA as well as  – in an unparalleled
political alliance – the opposing forces in Congress to
rally around their project, which oscillates between
hegemonic and imperial dominance of the USA. For
many it directly picked up where Reagan had left off.
William Kristol, one of the most influential players in
the neo-conservative field, summed up this dramatic
change in 2003 in the words: »The members of the Pre-
sident’s foreign policy team have all become Reagani-
tes.«7
But the members of this group under-estimated the
dynamics of the opposition outside Congress to the war
in Iraq and the danger of dissidence within the ranks of
the military. They also failed to get the majority of people
of other countries behind the project of American Empi-
re – with the exception of Israel, the majority in even
those countries who belonged to the »coalition of the wil-
ling« was against the war of the USA. On the domestic
front, this shift went hand in hand with a marked shift of
power from the legislative to the executive and the re-
organisation of activist »Big Government« under the ban-
ner of »internal security« (»homeland security«) the likes
of which had not been seen in half a century.
The rhetoric, conception and strategy of this group are
nothing if not radical. Their goal is to break away from
the general strategic political consensus that had pre-
vailed among the dominant US elites for decades. They
draw their dynamics from the single-minded mobilisati-
on for war – »We are in a world war. We are in World
War Four« (as the former CIA director James Woolsey
put it on 24 July 2002). Their tactical promise: the new,
technologically revolutionary wars that the USA would
wage would be a walkover. Their dynamic political core
is an alliance of Reaganite-minded military and natio-
nalistic neo-conservatives. Many of them have ties to
the armaments and oil industries.8 Within the Bush
administration this power micro-network forms clusters
around the Vice-President, in the Pentagon, the National
Security Counsel as well the Departments of State and
Justice. Members of this alliance are
• Paul Wolfowitz, the intellectual who calls the shots,
from 1989 till 1993 Under-Secretary of Defense for
Policy under the current Vice-President Dick Cheney,
since March 2001 Deputy Secretary of Defense under
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld;
• Dick Cheney, Vice-President, who began his career
under Rumsfeld in the Nixon era and stems from the cul-
ture of the »corporate Washington-insider class« (J.M.
Marshall). His wife Lynne Cheney held a top position at
the huge US armaments concern Lockheed Martin until
2001; she is also well-positioned in the neo-conservative
think tank American Enterprise Institute (AEI); 
• Richard Perle, in the Reagan administration 1981-
1989 Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Policy, until March 2003 head of the high-
ranking Pentagon advisory council Defence Policy
Board, then forced to resign;
• William Kristol, the son of the influential neo-conser-
vative theoretician Irving Kristol,9 former chief-of-staff
6  Walden Bello, Unravaling of the Atlantic Alliance? in: TNI Focus
on Trade, No. 81, September 2002
7  The Weekly Standard, 10 February 2003 
8  S. William Hartung, Michelle Ciarroca, The Military-Industrial-
Think Tank Complex, in: Multinational Monitor 1-2/2003; regarding
the whole complex cf. the German website »Neue Weltordnung«
(New World Order) of H. J. Krysmanski [http://www.uni-muenster.de/
PeaCon/global-texte/globalsw0203.htm]
9  Irving Kristol is the publisher and co-editor-in-chief of The Nation-
al Interest, the main neo-conservative scholarly foreign policy peri-
odical.
3of Reagan’s Vice-President Dan Quayle, a regular com-
mentator on the ABC News programme ›This Week‹ and
editor-in-chief of the neo-conservative opinion-maker
»The Weekly Standard« (circulation ca. 60,000) publish-
ed by Rubert Murdoch;
• Donald Rumsfeld, 21st and 13th Secretary of Defense
of the USA, previously chief-of-staff in the White House
and NATO-ambassador of the USA. Together with Perle,
Wolfowitz, Cheney and Kristol, Rumsfeld forms the core
of this Reaganite neo-conservative alliance;
• I. Lewis Libby, in the first Bush administration under
Cheney Deputy Under-Secretary of Defense for Policy;
in the second Bush administration he held the central
position of Vice-President Cheney’s chief-of-staff;
• Zalmay Khalilzad, worked closely with Paul Wolf-
owitz under Reagan and George Bush Sr. resp. his
Secretary of Defense Cheney and in the second Bush
administration became commissioner for Afghanistan
and later Iraq;
• John R. Bolton, former Vice-President of the Ameri-
can Enterprise Institute (AEI) and on the advisory board
of the Jewish Institute of National Security Affairs, is
Under-Secretary for Arms Control and International
Security at the Department of State;
• Elliott Abrams, formerly Reagan’s Assistant Secretary
of State for Human Rights and then Assistant Secretary
for Inter-American Affairs – at the time deeply implicat-
ed in the Iran-Contra affair, now Senior Director for
Near East and North African Affairs on the National
Security Council;
• Douglas Feith, Under-Secretary of Defense for Policy,
long-standing collaborator of Richard Perle;
• Stephen J. Hadley, now Deputy National Security
Advisor in the White House; as Assistant Secretary of
Defense he worked for Wolfowitz when the latter was at
the Pentagon under Dick Cheney. He is a member of the
Defense Policy Board;
• Eliot Cohen, in the first Bush administration on the
planning board of the Pentagon and then a member of
Rumsfeld’s Defense Policy Board under Perle;
• Eric Edelman, the security advisor to Dick Cheney;
• Dov Zakheim, the most important »keeper of the purse«
in the Pentagon (Under-Secretary for Comptroller);
• Peter Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs, who earned his first
merits as Henry Kissinger’s Special Assistant and then
under Reagan resp. the first Bush administration held
several positions at the Department of State and the
National Security Council;
• William J. Schneider, chairman of the Defense Sci-
ence Board of the Pentagon, under Reagan Under-
Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and
Technology;
• Stephen Cambone, in the first Bush administration re-
sponsible for strategic defense policy, then in the second
Bush administration he headed the Pentagon’s Office of
Program, Analysis and Evaluation;
• Thomas Donnelly, (Project for the New American
Century [PNAC]), in the meantime employed at Lock-
heed Martin;
• Robert B. Zoellick, worked at the Department of State
in the first Bush administration, in the second Bush
cabinet he is responsible for trade;
• Bruce Jackson from the armaments concern Lockheed
Martin is supposed to have been instrumental in the
draft of the loyalty declaration some countries of »New
Europe« addressed to the US, plays a key role in the
establishment of US power positions in Eastern Europe;
• Robert Kagan, in Brussels at the think tank Carnegie
Endowment, was also George Schultz’ speech-writer
and is considered to be one of the most influential pro-
moters of the concept of »American Empire«.10
Members of this network are present in many journalis-
tic, political and organisational contexts, often in asso-
ciation with others such as the President’s brother Jeb
Bush, or William J. Bennett, Francis Fukuyama, Fred C.
Ikle, Donald Kagan, Norman Podhoretz, Stephen P.
Rosen, Samuel P. Huntington, Richard Armitage, Rich-
ard V. Allen, Gary Bauer, Midge Decter, Jeane Kirkpat-
rick, Charles Krauthammer etc.
The members of this power micro-network have a great
deal in common: the political career, of the same gener-
ation, but above all the ideological orientation, involve-
ment in key political projects, wealth and similar or
even the same institutional networking. Before they
could position themselves in the institutions and power
structures of the Bush administration, this group worked
co-operatively in nearly a dozen think tanks that were
intensely involved in the development of strategic con-
cepts in the 1990’s and frequently financed by the same
foundations. Among these are the Hoover Institution on
war, revolution and peace at Stanford University, the
Heritage Foundation, the Hudson Institute, the Project
for the New American Century (PNAC), founded in
1997 in the »Reaganite spirit«; the American Enter-
prise Institute (in whose building the PNAC resides);
the Center for Security Policy (CSP), founded in 1998,
and its advisory board NSAC, which developed into a
central meeting-place for Reaganite politicians and
ideologists in the 1990’s and together with the AEI pro-
vided dozens of key figures to the Bush administration;
in addition, the Committee for the Liberation of Iraq
(CLI), the Center for Strategic and International Stu-
dies (CSIS), the Jewish Institute for Security Affairs,
10  Cf. Robert Kagan, Power and Weakness, in: Policy Review 113
(2002), revised German version: Macht und Ohnmacht. Amerika und
Europa in der neuen Weltordnung, Berlin 2003. It is worth mentioning
that Kagan’s wife Victoria Nuland is the security advisor to Dick
Cheney. 
4Empower America, the National Institute for Public
Policy and the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research.
Several neo-conservative educational institutions (Paul
Nitze School of Advanced International Studies [SAIS]
and the John M. Olin Center for Strategic Studies) also
play an important role in this network.
Characteristic for the whole network is its powerful
presence in some of the national media such as the Wall
Street Journal, Fox News, the Washington Times and the
New York Post as well as periodicals such as Public
Interest, National Review, National Interest, The New
Republic, Insight, Frontpage, First Things and Com-
mentary Magazine. A key position is held by Rupert
Murdoch’s News Corporation, to which the Fox News
Network, the New York Post and the Weekly Standard
belong. »Lots of people at Fox have supported Bush’s
policies. They have earned it that they and Murdock
himself get a little notice.«11 The network and its insti-
tutions are financed primarily by foundations, which to
some extent in the Reagan era, but above all in the
1990’s carried out a carefully calculated extreme right-
wing funding policy. Among them are above all the US-
foundations Lynde & Harry Bradley Foundation, the
John M. Olin Foundation, the foundations of the Koch
Family, but also the Scaife-Foundations, the Castle
Rock Foundation and the Smith Richardson Founda-
tion, as well as individual financiers such as Bruce Kov-
ner, chairman of the Caxton Corp., Roger Hertog of
Alliance Capital Management or Conrad Black, chair-
man of Hollinger International Inc. (Richard Perle
belongs to its board of directors). The financial power of
these foundations is considerable: in the 1990’s Richard
Mellon Scaife was among the 50 wealthiest private per-
sons in the USA, Koch-Industries are the second largest
private enterprise in the USA.12 »It’s a small world,«
said William Kristol to characterise this world of neo-
conservatism.13
The strategy and its basic components
Development of the assessments and objectives
In the past half-century the USA has followed a twofold
objective, »to make the world safe for capitalism»14 und
»to ensure American primacy within world capitalism.»
Making the world secure meant a fundamental frontal
confrontation with non-capitalistic movements and
social orders, but ensuring American primacy meant
above all containing and breaking up competing candi-
dates for hegemony in the Eurasian heartland in a »long
war« (Phillip Bobbitt) from 1917 till 1989. In the con-
frontation with the Soviet Union this dual objective of
safeguarding capitalism and American hegemony were
two sides of the same coin. As the »liberal hegemonic
power« the USA operated through a set of multilateral
institutions that at the same time conveyed, legitimised
and disguised the military dominance. In addition, there
was a second set of »Western-American« values that
laid claim to universal validity. After 1989 the military,
technological and economic power of the USA was on
the rise, but even at the beginning of the 1990’s in a
debate in the journals International Security and For-
eign Affairs what was called the »unipolar moment«
after the collapse of the USSR15 did not change the pre-
dominant assessment that the new unrivalled superiori-
ty of the USA was still subject to historical and real-
political limitations. For this reason during the Clinton
administration the strategic options of »liberal multi-
lateralism« (Ikenberry), of soft power and the limited
use of military means of force were basically retained.16
The main priority was to initiate, support and control the
capitalist transformation processes in the state-socialist
countries and to slowly fill the power vacuum that had
emerged. The focus was on the economy.
Long before 9/11 a competing option had existed that
increasingly gained influence. It is reflected in the
report »Rebuilding America’s Defense«, published in
2000 by the neo-conservative »Project for the New
American Century«.17 It gives a description of the new
global constellation that was to become the hegemonic
blueprint for interpretation after September 2001: »Over
the decade of the post-Cold-War period, however,
almost everything has changed. The Cold War world
was a bipolar world; the 21st century world is – for the
11 William Kristol, who certainly should know, quoted from Joe
Hagan, President Bush’s Neoconservatives Were Spawned Right here
in N.Y.C., New Home of the Right-Wing Gloat, in: New York Obser-
ver, 28 April 2003
12  Cf. http://www.mediatransparency.org and Bruce Murphey, Neo-
conservative clout seen in U.S. Iraq policy, in: Milwaukee Journal
Sentinel, 6 April 2003
13  Quoted in Hagan, President Buch’s Neoconservatives [11]
14  Perry Anderson, Force and Consent, in: New Left Review 17 Sep-
tember/October 2002, pp. 5ff.
15 Christopher Layne, The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great
Powers Will Rise, in: International Security 4/1993, pp. 5-51; Charles
Krauthammer, The Unipolar Moment, in: Foreign Affairs No. 70
(1990-91); Michael Mastanduno, Preserving the Unipolar Moment,
in: International Security 4/1997
16  Cf. Jan Lodel, The Price of Dominance, New York: Council of
Foreign Relations Press, 2001; G. John Ikenberry (ed.), America Unri-
valed: The Future of the Balance of Power, Ithaca 2002; Joseph S.
Nye, Jr., The Paradox of American Power: Why the world’s only
superpower can’t go it alone, New York 2002
17  Among the authors were Devon Cross, Cohen, Wolfowitz, Libby,
Bolton, Cambone and Zakheim (http://www.newamericancentury.org/
RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf). Cf. also a comparable report by
Frank Carlucci, Robert Hunter, and Zalmay Khalilzad (eds.), Taking
Charge: A Bipartisan Report to the President-Elect on Foreign Policy
and National Security, Santa Monica [RAND] 2001 (http://www.rand.
org/publications/MR/MR1306)
5moment, at least – decidedly unipolar, with America as
the world’s ›sole superpower.‹ America’s strategic goal
used to be containment of the Soviet Union; today the
task is to preserve an international security environment
conducive to American interests and ideals. The mili-
tary’s job during the Cold War was to deter Soviet
expansionism. Today its task is to secure and expand the
›zones of democratic peace;‹ to deter the rise of a new
great-power competitor; defend key regions of Europe,
East Asia and the Middle East; and to preserve Ameri-
can pre-eminence through the coming transformation of
war made possible by new technologies. From 1945 to
1990, U.S. forces prepared themselves for a single,
global war that might be fought across many theaters; in
the new century, the prospect is for a variety of theater
wars around the world, against separate and distinct
adversaries pursuing separate and distinct goals. During
the Cold War, the main venue of superpower rivalry, the
strategic ›center of gravity,‹ was in Europe … the new
strategic center of concern appears to be shifting to East
Asia.«18
The report summarised this view of a »unipolar 21st
century« in a handy table at the bottom of this page.
Cold War 21st Century
Security system Bipolar Unipolar
Strategic goal Contain Soviet Preserve 
Union Pax Americana
Main military Deter of Soviet Secure and expand 
mission(s) Expansionism zones of 
democratic peace;






Main military Potential global Potential
threat(s) war across theaters
many theater wars spread
across globe
Focus of Europe East Asia
strategic 
competition
The attacks of 11 September 2001 did not really change
any part of the two fundamental objectives (»safeguard-
ing global capitalism in exchange for American hege-
mony«), but three options for taking action came to the
fore that reflected the change in priorities:
• Where there are no longer competing hegemonic
powers, it is a matter of intervening to prevent their
emergence in the first place. The task is no longer
»deterrence« of a competitor, adversary or enemy, but
rather to nip the emergence of such a competitive situa-
tion in the bud.
• Security must be exported to zones in which new glob-
alising capitalism is still »insecure« or unstable.
• With terrorism finally becoming a global phenomenon
that poses a new direct threat to the USA as the primary
capitalist power, a global projection of military power
becomes equally compelling.
9/11 influenced the methodology of solving these tasks
and their legitimisations. On the one hand, the road to a
policy of mass mobilisation by means of bellicose rhe-
toric became accessible. This made the use of military
force as an instrument of foreign policy and coercive
diplomacy appear normal and compared with hegemo-
nic rhetoric ever more imperial rhetoric came to the
fore. On the other hand, the use of risk-reduced war tech-
nology had become a real possibility, some of which had
already been tested in the wars of the 1990’s (Iraq, Yugo-
slavia), and this made a global military power projection
of the USA possible in the long run. Finally, with the
»war against terrorism« a new lever had been created to
bring regional powers (Russia, China) into the fold. 9/11
associated the situation of war with an understanding of
the USA now being an openly revisionist power that
strives to change the international system in order to
solve the three tasks outlined above. From now on, the
use of US military power is not to be reactive and
passive, but rather active and offensive – »our best defense
is a good offense«, as formulated in the NSS.19
The assessments and strategies of the Bush administra-
tion drew conclusions from the situation after 1989 and
2001 – and they became a power factor. Gradually, by
the autumn of 2002, their advocates were able to imple-
ment them as the decisive factors (up till then).
1. Directly after the attack on the World Trade Center,
the reaction of the US administration concentrated only
on the battle (»war«) against terrorist groups that it sus-
pected to find in over 60 countries. A decisive factor in
opening up options for action was die definition of the
situation which followed directly after the attacks. They
were not characterised as »crimes«, but rather as »war«
against a global enemy who made a fundamental politi-
cal distinction possible: »either you are with us, or you
18  pp. 2f.
19  NSS, p. 6 [1]
20  George W. Bush, »Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the
American People«, Washington, 20 September 2001. A few days later
the former speaker of the Republican Party in the House of Represent-
atives Newt Gingrich: »There are only two teams on the planet for this
6are with the terrorists«20. From this moment Bush founded
his presidential legitimisation on his leadership in war
and the virtues and values it invoked: »We have found
our mission« (Bush). This mission was the victory in
war. But war forces partners as well as competitors to
choose between support and opposition.
2. Neither Cheney nor Rice nor Bush had Iraq on their
agenda – but Rumsfeld,21 Perle and above all Wolfowitz
did; the latter most clearly recognised that the threat to
security through terrorism and geopolitical empower-
ment overlapped, and he jumped into the topical gap
between them. Wolfowitz was able to make the most
essential contribution to focussing the planning of these
objectives; two days after 11 September he declared that
the USA would be »…ending states who sponsor terror-
ism« (›PBS-Frontline‹). Especially since the beginning
of 2003, more voices have been raised who do not limit
the »imperial oversight« (Max Boot) of the USA to Iraq,
but also include Saudi Arabia, Iran, Syria (Boot) and
Libya (Bolton). Perle made a case for »regime change«
in Syria and Iran (through internal revolts) and Libya
(where pressure from the outside is needed).
3. In his address on the State of the Union in January
2002, Bush extended the legitimacy of the use of mili-
tary means against terrorist organisations to include
states (»axis of evil«) that threaten the USA with weapons
of mass destruction regardless of any connections with
terrorist groups. Both connotations – to weapons of
mass destruction and to terrorism –  picked up the wide-
spread rhetoric of the Clinton administration on »rogue
states«.22
4. In April 2002 the President declared the »regime
change« in Iraq to be a military objective – in strategic
documents of the 1990’s such talk about »regime
change« had not explicitly played a role, but, of course,
the USA had always been trying to bring it about.
5. In his fundamental programmatic speech at West
Point Military Academy in June 2002, Bush declared
that the former doctrines of deterrence, containment and
balance of power were no longer sufficient. He empha-
sised the ideas of prevention (»pre-emptive action«) and
intervention. From now on, he said, »We must take the
battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the
worst threats before they emerge«23. »Pre-emptive
action«, »regime change« and »disarmament« have
become buzz words of the rhetoric of the Bush adminis-
tration.
6. Finally the claim of the USA to global military sov-
ereignty was formulated, which is regarded as the key to
the reconstruction of a new international regime that
guarantees security hegemonically mediated by stabili-
ty. The overriding objective is not the defense of the ter-
ritory of the USA or the battle against terrorist groups
or states, but rather retaining and consolidating the
inequality between the USA and the rest of the world by
preventing the emergence of hegemonic competitors
and perfecting the world-wide assertion of the American
dominated model through »export of security« (Bar-
nett). It is a matter of safeguarding the »functioning
core« of the hegemonic structure and the gradual clo-
sure of the »gaps«.24 This is the only way to simulta-
neously ensure that no military attack can be launched
against the USA (»homeland«) and that the paradox
tie between vulnerability and invincibility can be dis-
solved. A USA »beyond challenge« (Bush, NSS) is the
concept in the face of which all other political objec-
tives pale. If this strategy of reducing the commitment
of the USA to international alliances and global groups
becomes part of power politics, then the USA positions
itself against the rest of the world.
Military superiority
The first means to achieve this objective is to guarantee
unrivalled military superiority. On the domestic front
war. There’s the team that represents civilization and there’s the team
that represents terrorism. Just tell us which. There are no neutrals.«
Quoted from Steven E. Miller, The End of Unilateralism or Unilatera-
lism Redux? in: The Washington Quarterly 1/2002, p. 19.
21  »According to CBS information, notes taken by military person-
nel who were with Rumsfeld during the attacks recorded his words:
‘best info fast. judge whether good enough to hit S. H’ – meaning Sad-
dam Hussein – although the reports of all intelligence services point
to Osama bin Laden as the person responsible for the attacks. ›At the
same time, not only UBL [bin Laden],‹ the notes record Rumsfeld’s
own words: ›Go massive. Sweep it all up. Things related and not,‹ as
reported by CBS.« AP-Bay-Area.com 5 September 2002 and Bob
Woodward, We Will Rally the World, in Washington Post, 28 January
2002
22  Cf. Paul D. Hoyt: ‚Rogue States’ and International Relations,
speech held at the 40th ISA annual meeting in Washington, 16 – 20
February 1999. According to international law the possession of weap-
ons of mass destruction has nothing to do with an attack situation,
which alone would justify a preventive strike. 
23  George W. Bush, »Remarks at 2002 Graduation Exercise of
the US. Military Academy», West Point, NY, 1 June 2002.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html
24  This terminology stems from Thomas P. M. Barnett, since 2001
Assistant for Strategic Futures in the Office of Force Transformation
of the Pentagon, cf. his article The Pentagon’s New Map, in: Esquire
3/2003. According to Barnett, of the 132 military interventions of the
USA in the past twelve years, 95% were in areas he calls »gaps«,
which (in his terminology) were either not ready or willing to couple
up to (US-American dominated) capitalist globalisation and in which
ca. 2 billion people live. This gap has to be closed by the military
»export of security«: »the basic argument that it is important for the
United States over time to-in effect-export security to those parts of
the world that lack internal regional security because it encourages
foreign direct investment by outside corporations.« (Barnett on 13
February 2003 in the Glen Mitchell Show; http://www.nwc.navy.mil/
newrulesets/Glenn%20Mitchell%20show.htm). Correspondingly: dif-
ferentiated procedures as well: multilateralism to safeguard the
»core«, selective bilateralism to safeguard the transition regions be-
tween the core and the gap, pre-emptive unilateralism to reduce the
»gap« – the latter will be the »main objective of the security policy of
the USA in the 21st century«. 
7this requires a build-up of national potential: arma-
ments, strengthening the military and the culture of the
military. In terms of foreign policy it means preventing
the emergence of military and political competition by
all necessary means. As early as February 1992 the draft
of the Pentagon’s »Defense Planning Guide« for 1994-
1999 stated: »Our first objective is to prevent the re-
emergence of a new rival, either on the territory of the
former Soviet Union or elsewhere, that poses a threat on
the order of that posed formerly by the Soviet Union.«
The USA, the document declared, »must maintain the
mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from
even aspiring to a larger regional or global role«.25 Now
as then this document was understood as »the doctrine
of a world dominated by Washington«.26 The NSS,
published over a decade later, underscores this objec-
tive: »Our forces will be strong enough,« it states, »to
dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military
build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equalling, the power
of the United States.«27 In an interview on the Public
Broadcasting Network the national security advisor
Condoleeza Rice put it more bluntly: »But if it comes to
allowing another adversary to reach military parity with
the US in the way that the Soviet Union did, no, the US
does not intend to allow that to happen, because if it
happens, there will not be a balance of power that
favours freedom.«28 Consistent with this, the so-called
»threat-based« military planning is replaced by a »capa-
bilities-based approach«, according to which arma-
ments and military positioning should be designed to
counter any conceivable military action by any conceiv-
able adversary at any conceivable time. »Our challenge
in this new century is a difficult one: to prepare to
defend out national against the unknown, the uncertain,
the unseen and the unexpected.« (D. Rumsfeld on 31
January 2002).29 This armaments and military policy has
been dubbed the sum of all fears-approach. 
Preventive wars
The second element of this policy is the doctrine of
»pre-emption« – and, above all »prevention«. Whereas
pre-emption is an action legitimised by international law
when an attack is demonstrably, hence practically without
a doubt, imminent or has already taken place, the idea of
prevention waives these conditions of the impending
attack being beyond all doubt and really demonstrable.
The criterion of the imminence of a threat which estab-
lishes the permissibility of a »preventive« action accord-
ing to international law is rejected; terrorist attacks are
not publicly announced beforehand and the preparations
are not visible, hence such imminence of a threat does not
exist in fact and therefore cannot be recognised.
Hitherto the option of a preventive war had only been
mentioned behind the scenes in the USA and was sel-
dom articulated publicly. Examples of this were threat-
ening to use nuclear weapons against North Korea or the
justifications of the cruise missile attacks on Afghanistan
or Sudan under Clinton. Under Bush both options were
upgraded at the expense of the options containment and
deterrence, and the difference between pre-emption and
prevention was blurred in favour of expanding the idea
of prevention. Now preventive war actions are explicit-
ly permitted. They are considered permissible when
they are military attacks on terrorist groups, against sta-
tes supporting them and against states that either are
already in possession of weapons of mass destruction or
in the process of gaining or even just striving to gain
possession of them. After 9/11 there was a massive
increase in calls for a policy of prevention, the NSS is
worded accordingly.30 Preventive war becomes an »oper-
ative idea«.31
The reference to the »global war on terror« to justify
preventive war has been highly successful and offers
five openings for military action:
1. When there is reference to terror that could not be
identified beforehand, the military action is uncoupled
from the real actions of an enemy. The idea of self-
defence, at the root of the concept of pre-emption, is
abandoned. What used to be regarded as the last resort
becomes the norm – striving for a »license for perma-
nent preventive war«32. The high insecurity of informa-
tion and decision-making, hence the danger of destabi-
lisation that characterises a policy of prevention is not
under discussion here.
2. When there is talk of »war«, the idea of prevention
can be inserted into the traditional model of war with its
whole gamut of violent measures. By shifting legitimi-
25  New York Times, 8 March 1992.The text showed the hand of Wolf-
owitz and Libby. After it became known, the authors retracted it. The
PNAC report »Rebuilding America’s Defense« explicitly picked up
the thread where this draft left off.
26  Cf. Anthony Lewis, Bush and Iraq, in: The New York Review of
Books, 7 November 2002; S. Michael, T. Klare, Endless Military
Superiority, in: The Nation, 15 July 2002; Nicholas Lemann, The Next
World Order, in: The New Yorker, 1 April 2002; and Frances FitzGer-
ald, George Bush & the World, in: The New York Review of Books, 26
September 2002
27  NSS, p. 30
28 The Times of India, 26 September 2002
29 http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2002/1/31/163455.
shtml
30  In the wording of the NSS: »The U.S. can no longer solely rely on
a reactive posture as we have in the past.« – »We cannot let our ene-
mies strike first.« – »We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to
the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries.« – »To forestall
or prevent hostile acts by our adversaries, the U.S. will, if necessary,
act pre-emptively.« – »We must build and maintain our defenses
beyond challenge« and »dissuade future military competition.«
31  Interview, The Newshour with Jim Lehrer, PBS, 4 February 2002
32  Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2 March 2002
8sation of military action to apply to states that support
terrorists, the doctrine could be incorporated into mili-
tary policy traditionally focussed on enemy states. The
Nuclear Posture Review, formulated in January 2002,
allows nuclear weapons to be used against states
(»rogue states«) that themselves do not possess nuclear
weapons but are only suspected of developing or trying
to gain possession of such weapons.33
3. When reference is made to the globality of terror (»60
states«), the spatial restriction of military action is aban-
doned: the license to wage preventive war is valid world-
wide. Since this new quality of terror, against which war
is being waged, is a global phenomenon, the Rubicon to
a global claim to sovereignty has been crossed: The USA
is supposed to have the singular right to intervene every-
where in the world – including »pre-emptive«, »antici-
patory«, »anti-access-denial« military action.
4. In the debate after 9/11, preventive military interven-
tion has been detached from the original security and
military legitimisations; this also distinguishes the poli-
tics of the Bush administration from its predecessors.
And a hardly audible parallel discussion emerges:
taking precautionary, hence preventive measures to hin-
der a presumptive global rival from emerging – the con-
cept is to wage preventive war so that no new challenge
can arise, safeguarding hegemony instead of peace.
5. Where limitation of war is breached in this manner,
there is danger that another dam will burst as the result
of the asymmetry of such military actions: it facilitates
the connection to the classical waging of civil war that




The third element of the new Grand Strategy is, above
all, the idea of an exclusive right to preventive military
intervention everywhere in the world. The strategy of
preventive war (pre-emption), understood as expanding
the paradigms of deterrence and containment, means
transition to a policy of prevention based solely on the
sovereignty of the USA. The concept behind this is that
in a future world order the USA alone has the right to
sovereignty that can be realised on a global scale: »Yet
the course of this nation does not depend on the deci-
sions of others.« (Bush)35 The meaning of this concept
of global sovereignty is that the USA lays down unila-
teral rules on an international basis (e.g. alliances and
bloc formations), formulates universally valid objec-
tives (»expand liberty«), determines what constitutes a
crisis (»state of emergency«) and differentiates between
friend and foe and then decides on the use of force.
Alone the USA has the capability to use force ever-
ywhere in the world, hence in future its military presen-
ce will not be limited to North America, Europe and
Northeast Asia: »To contend with uncertainty and to
meet the many security challenges we face, the United
States will require bases and stations within and beyond
Western Europe and Northeast Asia, as well as tempor-
ary access arrangements for the long-distance deploym-
ent of U.S. forces.« (NSS, p. 29). Only the USA is capa-
ble of disciplining neo-liberal global capitalism. At the
most, it enters into temporary, limited alliances between
unequal partners. The World Order at stake here is not a
common undertaking of great powers, but rather the
result of military hegemony of the USA. The USA is the
system administrator of globalisation.36 It possesses the
eminent right to restrict the sovereignty of other nation-
states and intervene as it sees fit. The Director of Policy
Planning at the US State Department Richard Haass
puts it this way: »What you're seeing from this Admini-
stration is the emergence of a new principle or body of
ideas – I'm not sure it constitutes a doctrine – about
what you might call the limits of sovereignty. Sover-
eignty entails obligations. One is not to massacre your
own people. Another is not to support terrorism in any
way. If a government fails to meet these obligations,
then it forfeits some of the normal advantages of sover-
eignty, including the right to be left alone inside your
own territory. Other governments, including the United
States, gain the right to intervene. In the case of terro-
rism, this can even lead to a right of preventive, or
peremptory, self-defense. You essentially can act in anti-
cipation if you have grounds to think it's a question of
when, and not if, you're going to be attacked.«37
Hegemonic law
»This new approach is revolutionary« in the opinion of
Henry Kissinger, who adds blunt criticism: »Just as the
willingness of the USA to ›justified preventive attacks’‹
is in full contradiction to modern international law.«
Such a conception violates the NATO-Pact and the
33  Cf. Stephen Blank, The Return of Nuclear War, ISA, Los Angeles
2002
34  Cf. Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War, Bloomington
1983; Pierre Hassner, The United States: the empire of force or the
force of empire? Chaillot Papers No. 54, Paris, September 2002, pp.
174
35  On 28 January 2003, cf. New York Times, 29 January 2003
36  Thomas P. M. Barnett and Henry H. Gaffney Jr., Global Transca-
tion Strategy, in: Early Bird Supplement, 30 April 2003
37  Quoted in Nicholas Lemann, The Next World Order, in: The New
Yorker, 1 April 2002 
(http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/ ?020401fa_FACT1)
9regulations of the UN. Article 51 of the UN-Charta per-
mits the use of force by a state only when an attack is
taking place or is imminent. Hence, this is not a matter
of hegemonic unilateralism, but rather of enforcing it by
means of the breach of law.38 The risklessness resulting
from military superiority makes rulelessness a tempta-
tion. The erosion of the potential of international law to
limit wars continues at a dramatic pace since numerous
exceptions have been introduced in the past years:
prevention of humanitarian catastrophes (Yugoslavia),
protection from terrorism (Afghanistan), or even safe-
guarding vital resources (NATO-strategy 1999). The
USA lays claim to a special status others are not entitled
to. This marks a fundamental transition from a unipolar
hegemonic to a unipolar imperial system, rejection of
the norm of equality on which international law is
based. It is a step down the road back to an era when
state sovereignty meant the unfettered sovereignty to
wage wars.
Policy of devaluation
The USA rejects extensive ties to international alliances
and especially to the UN resp. to concepts of multilater-
al conflict management as a restriction of its freedom of
action. The articulated claim to global sovereignty
(»freedom from attack and freedom to attack«) includes
the devaluation of international ties via multilateral trea-
ties, international institutions and alliances and the
enforcement of American law on an international scale
as far as possible. There are numerous statements deval-
uing international institutions from neo-conservatives in
the Bush camp. A statement by Bolton illustrates this:
»There is no such thing as the United Nations (…) if the
UN Secretariat building in New York lost 10 stories, it
wouldn't make a bit of difference.« And: »There is an
international community that can be led by the only real
power left in the world, and that is the United States,
when it suits our interests and when we can get others to
go along.«39 Bush himself expressed his fear that the
Security Council is »a hollow debating society«40. Rich-
ard Perle also wrote that the »security through interna-
tional law, guaranteed by international institutions« is a
»liberal vanity« lying in »intellectual ruins«41. The
destabilisation of international security regimes is not
only accepted, it is actively pursued with the goal of
nullifying the historical achievement of the UN-Charta
limiting war and making the self-commitment of the
USA to international law conditional. Regulations of
multilateral armaments control were weakened: the
ABM-Treaty was terminated in December 2001,
attempts to reinforce the Bio-Weapons Accord broke
down at the 5th Verification Conference due to the resis-
tance of the USA42 .
Empire Reloaded
The new grammar
This transition from a unipolar hegemonic to a unipolar
imperial system was tersely summed up by Stephen
Peter Rosen, director of the neo-conservative Olin Insti-
tute for Strategic Studies (Harvard University) in mid-
2002: »The United States has no rival. We are militari-
ly dominant around the world. Our military spending
exceeds that of the next six or seven powers combined,
and we have a monopoly on many advanced and not so
advanced military technologies. We, and only we, form
and lead military coalitions into war. We use our mili-
tary dominance to intervene in the internal affairs of
other countries, because the local inhabitants are killing
each other, or harboring enemies of the United States, or
developing nuclear and biological weapons. A political
unit that has overwhelming superiority in military
power, and uses that power to influence the internal
behavior of other states, is called an empire. Because
the United States does not seek to control territory or
govern the overseas citizens of the empire, we are an
indirect empire, to be sure, but an empire nonetheless. If
this is correct, our goal is not combating a rival, but
maintaining our imperial position, and maintaining
imperial order. Planning for imperial wars is different
from planning for conventional international wars. In
dealing with the Soviet Union, war had to be avoided:
small wars could not be allowed to escalate, or to divert
us from the core task of defending Europe and Japan. As
a result, military power was applied incrementally.
Imperial wars to restore order are not so constrained.
The maximum amount of force can and should be used
as quickly as possible for psychological impact – to
demonstrate that the empire cannot be challenged with
impunity. During the Cold War, we did not try very hard
to bring down communist governments. Now we are in
the business of bringing down hostile governments and
creating governments favourable to us. Conventional
international wars end and troops are brought back
38  Cf. Mary Ellen O’Connell, Pre-Emption and Exception: The US
Moves Beyond Unilateralism, in: S+F 3/2002, p. 136
39  Quoted in Frances FitzGerald, George Bush & the World, in: The
New York Review of Books, 26 September 2002; cf. also the website
of the Council for a Livable World http://www.clw.org
40  Berliner Zeitung, 5 February 2003
41  Spiegel-Online, 28 March 2002
42  Peter Rudolf, Wie der 11. September die amerikanische Außenpo-
litik verändert hat. Bilanz nach einem Jahr, in: swp-aktuell 33, Sep-
tember 2002
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Times counted that the term »American Empire« had
appeared nearly 1000 times in the news in the previous
six months.44 Donald Rumsfeld had a study done on the
subject of Empire,45 the German foreign minister Josch-
ka Fischer expressed disbelief46 and, finally, the Presi-
dent of the USA47 himself – and he got an unheard echo
in tens of thousands of literally the same descriptions of
the United States that were varied at the demonstrations
on 15 February 2003.
The new concept
In the autumn of 2001 Max Boot of the Wall Street Jour-
nal wrote an article »The Case for an American Em-
pire«48 in which he justified the military occupation of
Afghanistan and Iraq with the stabilising effect British
domination had in this region in the 19th century. Since
this article appeared, the concept of Empire to character-
ise a globus americanus has been spreading like wild-
fire. In many and various ways attention is drawn to
America’s own colonial history and the first two cycles
in its attempt to create an American Empire (1898-1919
resp. in the era of Roosevelt’s »New Order«)49. In the
meantime, a core group of neo-conservative ideologists
has made »American Empire« as a political, to some
extent also as a scientific term to a battle-cry of their
own. »The logic of neoimperialism is too compelling
for the Bush Administration to resist … imperialist
revival«.50 Since then, the Empire debate has made
inroads into mainstream journalism, the discussions in
the political think tanks and, above all, the culture of
power. The »Global« that Clinton stood for has been
superseded by the »Imperial«.
The arguments of the supporters of the concept of Em-
pire is as simple as it is traditional. »We are the good
guys,« in the words of Max Boot. The USA is a »kind
hegemonic power«, a »benevolent empire« (Kristol).
Accordingly, a distinction must be made between good
and bad Empire. Empire carries within itself the poten-
tial for good – e.g. it can link the imperious logic of
home. Imperial wars end, but imperial garrisons must be
left in place for decades to ensure order and stability.
This is, in fact, what we are beginning to see, first in
the Balkans and now in Central Asia. In addition to
advanced-technology weaponry, an imperial position
requires a large but lightly armed ground force for
garrison purposes and as reassurance for allies who
want American forces on their soil as symbols of our
commitment to their defense. Finally, imperial strategy
focuses on preventing the emergence of powerful,
hostile challengers to the empire: by war if necessary,
but by imperial assimilation if possible.«43
For about a year and a half the »new unilateralism«
(Charles Krauthammer) of the USA has been accompa-
nied by a political and political science grammar that
operates with the terms Empire and American Empire.
Politicians like Henry Kissinger spoke of it (»Empire or
leader?») or Patrick J. Buchanan (»A Republic, not an
Empire«), writers like Gore Vidal (»The last Empire»),
Tom Wolfe (»the mightiest power on earth, as omnipo-
tent as... Rome under Julius Caesar»), Norman Mailer
(»to build a world empire«) or Jerry Pournelle (»…
empires … have been the largest, longest-lasting and
most stable form of political organisation for most of the
world through recorded history«), journalists like Roth-
stein (»An old idea transfomed. Call it Empire«) and
Maureen Dowd of the New York Times (»The Empire
Strikes First«) or Jay Tolson of the magazine U.S. News
& World Report (»Are we witnessing a smart-bomb
imperium?«), social and political scientists such as
Joseph F. Nye (»Not since Rome has one nation loomed
so large above the others.«), A. Etzioni (»Semi-Em-
pire«), Michael Ignatieff (»The Burden«) or Charles
Fairbanks of the Johns Hopkins University (»an empire
in formation«), historians like A. Schlesinger (»would
never be an empire«), Lewis Gaddis (»We are now even
more so an empire, definitely an empire«), Niall Fergu-
son (»The Empire Slinks Back«) or Michael Hirsh
(»relatively benign power«), finally neo-conservatives
like D’Souza (»America has become an empire, a fact
that Americans are reluctant to admit«), Max Boot (»to
enlarge the ›empire of liberty‹«), Deepak Lal (»In
Defense of Empires«), William Kristol (»And if people
want to say we’re an imperial power, fine.«) or Charles
Krauthammer (»The fact is no country has been as
dominant culturally, economically, technologically and
militarily in the history of world since the Roman Em-
pire«). At the beginning of May 2003 the New York
43  Stephen Peter Rosen, The Future of War and the American Mili-
tary, in: Harvard Magazine 5/2002. Rosen worked at the Department
of Defense auf the National Security Council of the USA as well as at
the Naval War College and was one of the founding members of
PNAC. 
44  New York Times, 10 May 2003
45  Cf. Thomas Powers, War and Its Consequences, in: The New York
Review of Books, 27 March 2003
46  Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 17 March 2003
47  The remarks quoted at the beginning of this text were made
in Bush’s speech at West Point in June 2002  (http://www.whitehouse.
gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html) and in a speech to
veterans at the White House in November 2002.
48  Cf. The Weekly Standard, 15 October 2001, p. 27, and Max Boot,
The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American
Power, New York 2002
49  Cf. Neil Smith, American Empire: Roosevelt’s Geographer and the
Prelude to Globalization, California 2003
50  Sebastian Mallaby, The Reluctant Imperialist: Terrorism, Failed
States, and the Case for American Empire, in: Foreign Affairs 2/2002,
pp. 2-3, 6  
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security with the virtue of world betterment. Imperial
appropriation and protection of restive places creates
calm, order and security for the inhabitants of Empire
and for the natives being incorporated, to whom the
New Order also brings democratic values and institu-
tions. In areas like Iraq, American Empire is »the last
hope for both democracy and security«.51
Whereas Boot thinks the USA is destined for this role of
Empire, which is to be formally realized through the
UN, Mallaby advocates an independent corporate body
outside the UN under the leadership of the US. At the
same time Robert Cooper, a leading foreign policy advi-
sor to the British Prime Minister Tony Blair, develops
the idea of »corporate empire«, to re-stabilise zones of
unrest (Afghanistan, Burma, Somalia, Colombia, Zim-
babwe) and to assure that the old British Empire
remains a player in the new game. »What is needed is a
new kind of imperialism, one compatible with human
rights and cosmopolitan values: an imperialism which
aims to bring order and organisation but which rests
today on the voluntary principle.«52
At the root of all the talk about American Empire is the
attempt to grasp the idea that America is no longer just
an exceptional super-, hyper- or hegemonic power.
Terms like these from the era of the Cold War and the
competition between the systems are now definitely
obsolete. What is needed is «the gorilla of geopolitical
designations«53 – Empire. The conceptual shift from
»hegemony« through »domination« to »empire« is sig-
nificant above all because the classical conception of
direct, permanent control by an imperial centre comes to
the fore. The »unipolar moment« after 1989 is supposed
to turn into a »unipolar era« (Krauthammer). Unlike the
imperia of history, it knows no »outside«. It is affected
by everything and considers everything its own. It is a
new order that is integrated through the nodes of global
networks, but their structure emanates from one centre.
The American Empire as Will and Idea is – still – only
an attempt to break out of the strategic constellation in
effect to date: Breakout. Resources, rhetoric, concepti-
on, strategy and politics of the Empire camp are not
new. But now they are in power. 
Translation: Joan Glenn
An updated and more comprehensive version (64 pages)
of this text in German can be found at 
http://www.rainer-rilling.de/texte/american%20em-
pire.pdf
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Rosa Luxemburg Foundation/Marburg University 
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51  Michael Ignatieff, The Burden, in: New York Times Magazine,
5 January 2003, p. 54
52  Robert Cooper, Why We Still Need Empires, in: The Guardian,
7 April 2002, p. 7, also in Ottawa Citizen, 5 May 2002, p. A14, quo-
ted in Ivan Eland, The Empire Strikes Out. The »New Imperialism«
and Its Fatal Flaws, in: Policy Analysis No. 459, 26 November 2002,
p. 4
53  Jonathan Freedland, Rome, AD … Rome, DC? in: The Guardian,
18 September 2002
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The Pentagon’s New Map
SO WHAT PARTS OF THE WORLD can be considered functioning right now? North Ameri-
ca, much of South America, the European Union, Putin’s Russia, Japan and Asia’s emerging
economies (most notably China and India), Australia and New Zealand, and South Africa,
which accounts for roughly four billion out of a global population of six billion. (…) 
If we map out U.S. military responses since the end of the cold war, (see below), we find an
overwhelming concentration of activity in the regions of the world that are excluded from
globalization’s growing Core – namely the Caribbean Rim, virtually all of Africa, the Balkans,
the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Middle East and Southwest Asia, and much of Southeast Asia.
That is roughly the remaining two billion of the world’s population. (…) If we draw a line
around the majority of those military interventions, we have basically mapped the Non-Inte-
grating Gap. (…) If a country is either losing out to globalization or rejecting much of the
content flows associated with its advance, there is a far greater chance that the U.S. will end
up sending forces at some point. (…) In many ways, the September 11 attacks did the U.S.
national-security establishment a huge favor by pulling us back from the abstract planning of
future high-tech wars against »near peers« into the here-and-now threats to global order. By
doing so, the dividing lines between Core and Gap were highlighted, and more important, the
nature of the threat environment was thrown into stark relief. Think about it: Bin Laden and Al
Qaeda are pure products of the Gap – in effect, its most violent feedback to the Core. (…)
But just as important as »getting them where they live« is stopping the ability of these terrorist
networks to access the Core via the »seam states« that lie along the Gap’s bloody boundaries.
It is along this seam that the Core will seek to suppress bad things coming out of the Gap. Which
are some of these classic seam states? Mexico, Brazil, South Africa, Morocco, Algeria, Greece,
Turkey, Pakistan, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia come readily to mind. (…)
If we step back for a minute and consider the broader implications of this new global map, then
U.S. national-security strategy would seem to be: 1) Increase the Core’s immune system
capabilities for responding to September 11-like system perturbations; 2) Work the seam states
to firewall the Core from the Gap’s worst exports, such as terror, drugs, and pandemics; and,
most important, 3) Shrink the Gap. (…)
The Middle East is the perfect place to start. (…) This country has successfully exported secu-
rity to globalization’s Old Core (Western Europe, Northeast Asia) for half a century and to its
emerging New Core (Developing Asia) for a solid quarter century following our mishandling
of Vietnam. But our efforts in the Middle East have been inconsistent – in Africa, almost
nonexistent. Until we begin the systematic, long-term export of security to the Gap, it will
increasingly export its pain to the Core in the form of terrorism and other instabilities. (…)
But it all has to begin with security, because free markets and democracy cannot flourish amid
chronic conflict. (…) In my mind, we fight fire with fire.
Thomas P. M. Barnett, The Pentagon’s New Map, in: Esquire March 2003.
Barnett is a professor at the Naval War College in Newport and has been Assistant for Strategic
Futures in the Office of Force Transformation at the Pentagon since September 2001.
